Life With Father?
From the Texas Lawyer, July 5, 1993
In a major family law change, the
Texas Supreme Court June 30 recognized
a biological father's constitutional
right to establish paternity even when
the child is born to a married couple.
In In the Interest of J.W.T., No. D-1742,
a 7-2 majority of the court overturned
the longstanding "marital presumption"
that has prevented some biological
fathers from suing for their parental
rights. J.W.T. was conceived while the
child's mother and husband were
separated.
The biological father, identified as
Larry G., had helped the mother pay for
prenatal care before she and her
estranged husband reconciled and dismissed
their divorce action. A paternity
test showed a 99.4 percent probability
that Larry was J.W.T.'s biological
father.
Justice Doggett wrote that the trial
court's denial of Larry's standing to sue
violated the due course of law guarantee
contained in article 1, section 19 of the
Texas Constitution.
Doggett discussed social changes,
such as divorce and single parents, that
have diminished the social stigma of
illegitimacy. The stigma is the historical
basis for denying paternity suits when a
child is born to an intact marriage.
"Perhaps this asserted interest had
merit in an earlier era when the true
biological father could not be established
with near certainty and when
illegitimacy carried a significant legal
and social stigma," Doggett said. "Since
this is no longer the case, the focus
should more properly be directed toward
what is best for the child - it may be in
[the] best interest of the child to allow
development of a relationship with the
natural father and it may not."
The majority made it clear that
courts should consider a father's actions.
"We thus believe that a father's interest
in establishing a relationship with his
biological child is constitutionally
protected when accompanied by the
father's early and unqualified
acceptance of parental duties."
Larry was represented by Tom
Oxford, managing attorney for the
Beaumont office of East Texas Legal
Services. Oxford said the ruling gives a
more expansive reading of the Texas
Constitution on this issue than the U.S.
Supreme Court gave to the federal due
process clause in a 1989 case, Michael
H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110.
Justice Enoch dissented, saying the
majority "ignores a powerful countervailing
interest, the family's right to be
free from unwanted interference and
disruption by state sanctioned attempts
to delegitimize the children of a marriage."
Justice Cornyn will write a dissent
later. Later concurring opinions are due
from Chief Justice Phillips and Justice
Hecht.
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